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Abstract
The paper reviews the state of the economic literature on the link between ﬁnancial development
and growth. We ﬁrst examine the issue of measurement of ﬁnancial development and the debate on the
direction of causality between ﬁnance and growth. Next, we extensively discuss the various channels
through which the ﬁnancial sector can aﬀect growth, including the increase in the eﬃciency of capital
allocation, the reduction in information costs, the improvement of risk management, and the support of
innovation. The analysis is conducted referring both to the theoretical literature and to the most recent
empirical ﬁndings. We conclude by drawing lessons for the current debate on the reform of the ﬁnancial
sector in the aftermath of the Great Recession.
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Introduction
Does ﬁnancial development aﬀect economic growth? This is probably one of the most challenging and
fascinating research questions that macroeconomists and ﬁnancial economists have faced in the last ﬁfty
years or so. A formalization of the idea that ﬁnance aﬀects economic growth dates back to Schumpeter's
discussion on the sources of development (Schumpeter, 1961). Schumpeter argued that the services provided
by ﬁnancial intermediaries are essential for technological innovation and economic development. Although
several theoretical and empirical studies later supported this hypothesis, a consensus is far from being reached.
While some scholars endorse the Schumpeterian idea, others contend that ﬁnancial development simply follows
economic growth or, at least, that the relationship between ﬁnancial and economic development has been
"over-stressed" (Lucas, 1988).
The last decade of the 20th century witnessed renewed interest for the topic. The emergence of the
endogenous growth theories (Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992))
induced scholars to pose the question whether the development of the ﬁnancial sector can be an engine of
growth. On the empirical side, the increasing availability of large cross-country data sets on income and
ﬁnancial institutions paved the way for more rigorous tests on the ﬁnance-growth link (Tsuru, 2000).
The debate on the topic has become even more intense in the late 1990s and at the beginning of the new
century. The ﬁnancial turbulences that hit ﬁrst South East Asia in the late 90s and more recently the United
States have stimulated interest towards the impact of ﬁnancial development on crises and macroeconomic
volatility. The literature has then started to acknowledge the possibility that ﬁnancial development fosters
long-run economic growth at the cost of generating higher volatility in the short run, for example by amplifying
the impact of small aggregate shocks.
Financial development is deﬁned by the World Economic Forum (2012) as the policies, factors, and
institutions that lead to eﬃcient intermediation and eﬀective ﬁnancial markets. In a neoclassical Arrow-
Debreu model, in which information is perfect, risk is fully and eﬃciently internalized in the price system,
suppliers of funds deal directly with users of funds in the ﬁnancial market, and, in turn, the ﬁnancial market
always adjusts to the equilibrium level of the interest rate that equalises supply and demand for funds.
Economies are however plagued by frictions. For instance, the problems of asymmetric information present
in ﬁnancial transactions lead to the well-known market failures of adverse selection and moral hazard. The
ﬁnancial system can ameliorate such problems. More in general, Levine (2005) points out ﬁve broad functions
that ﬁnancial intermediaries and ﬁnancial markets play and that could be relevant for economic growth: (i)
production of ex-ante information about investment opportunities; (ii) ex-post monitoring of investments; (iii)
trading, diversiﬁcation, and management of risk; (iv) mobilization and pooling of savings, and (v) exchange
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of goods and services. By performing these functions, the ﬁnancial sector can promote the formation of
(physical and human) capital, increase the degree of eﬃciency in the allocation of capital, minimize the cost
of information acquisition, improve the management of risk, and promote innovation.
This review of the the literature on the link between ﬁnancial development and growth is organised as
follows. Section 1 lays the grounds for the analysis, by deﬁning ﬁnancial development and discussing how it
can be measured. Section 2 addresses the debate on the direction of causality between ﬁnancial development
and growth. Section 3 examines the speciﬁc channels through which ﬁnancial development can aﬀect growth.
Section 4 outlines directions for future research and concludes.
1 Deﬁning and measuring ﬁnancial development
If the late 80s and early 90s saw the development of several theoretical studies aimed at analyzing the link
between ﬁnancial development and economic growth, in the last two decades a large number of economet-
ric studies have tried to empirically evaluate the impact of ﬁnancial variables on growth. Performing these
econometric analyses has required to advance in the construction of quantitative measures of ﬁnancial devel-
opment. The measurement of the performance and activities of ﬁnancial institutions and markets relies on
several indicators, such as the depth, size, accessibility, and soundness of the ﬁnancial system. There is how-
ever little consensus on the choice of the most eﬀective quantitative measures. Indeed, an issue that generates
contradictory results in the empirical literature is the lack of a single indicator that captures adequately the
various aspects of ﬁnancial development.
Quantitative measures of ﬁnancial development
King and Levine (1993) employ several measures to capture the size of ﬁnancial intermediaries: the proportion
of liquid liabilities to the GDP, the ratio of credit to private enterprises to the GDP, and the ratio of assets
of commercial banks to the sum of commercial banks' assets and assets of central banks. Demetriades
and Hussein (1996) simply consider the ratio of bank deposit liabilities to the GDP. Huang (2005) uses
diﬀerent indices depending on the object of measurement. To capture the depth of ﬁnancial intermediation,
he includes the amount of liquid liabilities, banks' overhead costs and net interest margins. To assess stock
market development, instead, he puts forth three main variables: stock market capitalization, total value
traded, and turnover ratio.
Saci and Holden (2008) measure the importance of the banking sector by considering, in addition to the
previous indicators, the ratio of commercial bank assets to commercial plus central bank assets, the ratio
of credit issued to the private sector to liquid liabilities, and the ratio of domestic credit to the private
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sector to the GDP. To capture stock market development they add the number of listed companies to
the previous indicators. Finally, Antzoulatos and Thanopoulos(2008) construct a more structured index of
ﬁnancial development, computed as a weighted index of banks', ﬁnancial institutions', stock market, and bond
market development. The proxies for banking sector development include bank deposits over the GDP, banks'
overhead costs, banks' concentration, banks' net interest margins. The proxies for the development of non-
bank ﬁnancial institutions include life and non-life insurance premia. The development of the stock market
is evaluated through the ratios of stock market capitalization to the GDP, stock market total value traded
to the GDP, and the turnover ratio of the stock market. Finally, the proxies for bond market development
include the ratios of private bond market capitalization to the GDP and public bond market capitalization
to the GDP. From the above review, it emerges that the most used measure of the overall size of the ﬁnancial
system is the value of some type of ﬁnancial assets generally expressed as a ratio of the GDP (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Financial Assets per capita (EURmln)
Source: Allianz, 2012
Many ﬁnancial systems of advanced economies feature not only a strong presence of banking institutions,
but also of other institutional actors such as pension funds, insurance companies, hedge funds, and mutual
funds. Therefore, despite the aggregate size of the ﬁnancial sector certainly provides useful information, it
should be integrated with speciﬁc information about the relative importance of sub-sectors. In the Handbook
on Financial Sector Assessment, the International Monetary Fund (2005) stresses that a correct assessment
of the development of the ﬁnancial structure should cover all the diﬀerent players engaging in ﬁnancial inter-
mediation: commercial and merchant banks, savings institutions, development ﬁnance institutions, insurance
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companies, mortgage entities, and pension funds. Moreover, in order to take into account the diﬀerent activ-
ities they perform, money, foreign exchange, and capital markets (including bonds, equities, and derivative
and structured ﬁnance products) should also be covered in the assessment (see Table 1).
Table 1: Assessing the development of the various ﬁnancial sector actors
SECTOR INDICATORS
Banking -Total number of banks -Bank deposits/GDP (%)
-Number of branches and outlets -Bank assets/total
-Number of branches/ ﬁnancial assets (%)
thousand population -Bank assets/GDP (%)
Insurance -Number of insurance companies -Gross life premia/GDP (%)
-Gross premia/GDP (%) -Gross non-life premia/GDP (%)
Pensions -Types of pension plans -Pension fund assets/GDP (%)
-Percentage of labor force -Pension fund assets/total
covered by pensions ﬁnancial assets (%)
Mortgage -Mortgage assets/total -Mortgage debt stock/GDP
ﬁnancial assets
Leasing -Leased assets/total
domestic investment
Money markets -Types and value of money -Number and value
market instruments of daily (weekly)
-New issues and growth transactions in the instruments
in outstanding value
Foreign -Volume and value of -Adequacy of foreign exchange (reserves
exchange markets daily foreign in months of imports, as ratio to
exchange transactions short-term ext. debt or to broad money)
Capital markets -Market capitalization/GDP (%) -Number of listed securities
-Value traded/mrkt capitalization (%) (bonds and equities)
-Size of derivative markets -Share of households, corporations,
-Number and value of new banks, and NBFIs
issues (bonds and equities) in the holdings of securities
Collective -Types and number of schemes -Total number of investors and
investment funds (unique and mixed funds) average balance per investor
-Total assets and growth rates -Share of households, corporations, banks,
(nominal and as percentage of GDP) and NBFIs, in total mutual funds assets
Source: IMF (2005)
Pitfalls of the quantitative measures
The measures described above might not accurately capture ﬁnancial development. For instance, the growth
of the credit-to-GDP ratio may reﬂect a ﬁnancial bubble and not the ﬁnancing of sound investment projects.
The severity of the recent ﬁnancial crisis has allegedly been due to the fact that in many countries banks had
expanded their balance sheets (i.e., increased their credit) without a corresponding increase in the level and
quality of capitalization. While, on the one hand, the expansion of credit may enable rapid economic growth
by allocating capital to growth prospects, on the other hand excessive leverage may amplify the volatility of
returns inducing greater probability of default.
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A review of the literature on the relationship between excess of leverage, asset bubbles and economic
growth is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless it is worth citing two contributions that show that
a mere expansion of the ﬁnancial sector is not necessarily positive for economic development. Geanakoplos
(2010) elaborates a theory in which the possibility of default creates the need for collateral. This in turn
entails variations in leverage that aﬀect the price of assets, contributing to bubbles and busts. According to
his view, when leverage (deﬁned as the ratio of collateral values to the required downpayment) grows rapidly
in boom times, asset prices tend to increase. In this leverage cycle, when the bubbles burst bad news cause
the asset price to crash much further than it would if leverage was not excessive, and the crash takes place
even if there is no subsequent crash in the fundamentals.
A second paper that shows that more intense ﬁnancial activity (more precisely, higher liquidity in the
ﬁnancial market) could be harmful to economic growth is Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). They show
that market liquidity (i.e., the ease with which trades occur) and traders' funding liquidity (i.e., the ease with
which they can obtain funding) are mutually reinforcing, leading to liquidity spirals. While market liquidity
(i.e. the volume and value of daily ﬁnancial transactions) is often seen as positive per se, the authors show
that, since it is correlated with volatility, loss spirals could arise if speculators hold a large initial position
that is negatively correlated with customers' demand shock. In this scenario, if investors become unable to
face funding market illiquidity, they are forced to engage in ﬁre sales, causing a further asset price drop, and
so forth. Therefore the apparent expansion of ﬁnancial markets leads to a more fragile economic environment
and to more severe eﬀects of ﬁnancial crises1.
In a diﬀerent vein, Petersen and Rajan (1995) suggest that another mere quantitative index of ﬁnancial
development, the number of banks, is not necessarily a synonymous of a more eﬃcient ﬁnancial sector. When
the credit market is concentrated, creditors are more likely to ﬁnance credit constrained ﬁrms, because it is
easier for them to internalize the beneﬁts of assisting ﬁrms. The ability of creditors to ﬁnance ﬁrms along
the lifespan of their activity allows them to smooth interest rates over the life cycle of the ﬁrms, charging
a lower-than-competitive rate when a ﬁrm is young and a higher-than-competitive rate when the ﬁrm ages.
A larger number of credit market actors could impose constraints on the ability of ﬁrms and creditors to
intertemporally share surplus, making ﬁrms worse oﬀ as they cannot obtain cheap funds when mostly needed,
that is, in the initial phase of their life cycle.
1Banking sectors can also act as a mechanism of ampliﬁcation of negative shocks (see, e.g., Guerrieri, Iacoviello and Minetti
(2012)).
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More comprehensive measures of ﬁnancial development
A more comprehensive measure of the ﬁnancial development of a country is perhaps represented by the
Financial Development Index computed by the World Economic Forum since 2008. Despite not having been
largely used in the economic literature, this index may convey a broad picture of the current global status
of ﬁnancial development. In deﬁning this index, seven factors (along with their mutual interactions) are
expected to inﬂuence the provision of ﬁnancial services (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Composition of the Financial Development Index
Source: World Economic Forum, 2012
Table 2: The Financial Development Index 2012 rankings
1 Hong Kong 11 Germany 21 Kuwait
2 United States 12 Denmark 22 Austria
3 United Kingdom 13 Norway 23 China
4 Singapore 14 France 24 Israel
5 Australia 15 South Korea 25 Bahrain
6 Canada 16 Belgium 26 United Arab Emirates
7 Japan 17 Finland 27 Portugal
8 Switzerland 18 Malaysia 28 South Africa
9 Netherlands 19 Spain 29 Chile
10 Sweden 20 Ireland 30 Italy
Source: World Economic Forum,2012
The ﬁrst three pillars capture the ability of the policy maker to lay the foundations for the development
of ﬁnancial activities: i) the institutional environment; ii) the business environment; and iii) the degree of
ﬁnancial stability. The second group of factors, instead, assess the eﬀective development of the various players
of the ﬁnancial sector: i) banking ﬁnancial services; ii) non-banking ﬁnancial services (e.g., investment banks
and insurance ﬁrms); and iii) ﬁnancial markets. The third category comprises measures of access to capital
and ﬁnancial services.
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Table 2 reports the 30 top-ranked countries according to the 2012 Financial Development Index. Com-
paring the ranking with that of previous years (not reported), it appears that there has been little change
within the list, showing how advancing on the path of ﬁnancial development is a long-run eﬀort. A similar
stickiness, albeit slightly lower, appears also in the analysis of the ranking of the single pillars. Institutional
environment, business environment, and non-banking ﬁnancial services exhibit lower rank movement; by
contrast, the degree of ﬁnancial stability, banking ﬁnancial services, ﬁnancial markets, and ﬁnancial access
pillars show greater movement in the ranking (World Economic Forum, 2012). The analysis of the single
pillars is not that important for the movements per se, but because it reveals the main drivers of ﬁnancial
development.
2 Financial development and growth: the direction of causality
Having deﬁned ﬁnancial development, the next step of our analysis consists of examining its link with eco-
nomic growth, meant as GDP growth or the per capita GDP. Figure 3 plots the Financial Development Index
and GDP per capita for 63 countries. The ﬁgure displays a positive relationship between the index of ﬁnancial
development and the per capita GDP, thus supporting the view that ﬁnancial sector development goes along
with economic development. King and Levine (1993) show that the positive correlation between the two
variables is robust to using various measures of ﬁnancial development. However, such a correlation does not
oﬀer insights into the direction of causality. Is ﬁnancial development that stimulates economic growth, or
does ﬁnancial development respond to the demand for ﬁnancial services of a growing real sector?
Figure 3: Financial Development Index and per capita GDP in 2012
Source: World Economic Forum,2012
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The macroeconomic approach
Analysing the possible direction of causality, Patrick (1966) puts forward a supply-leading hypothesis and
a demand-leading hypothesis. According to the ﬁrst, a more developed ﬁnancial infrastructure promotes
growth because it supplies new and more eﬃcient ﬁnancial services. This idea was ﬁrst proposed by Schum-
peter (1961) and then reﬁned theoretically and supported empirically by McKinnon (1973), King and Levine
(1993), Neusser and Krugler (1998), and Levine and Zervos (1998). Applying a GGM technique to a panel of
71 countries for the period 1960-1995, Levine et al. (2000) ﬁnd a link that goes from a higher level of banking
sector development to GDP growth and total factor productivity growth. Xu (2000) ﬁnds support for the
idea that ﬁnancial development promotes growth: through a VAR approach, he unveils a positive long-term
relationship between the development of the ﬁnancial sector and increases in investment and GDP at least
in 27 of the 41 economies examined over the period 1960-1993. More recently, Christopoulos and Tsionas
(2004) combine cross-sectional and time series data and ﬁnd a one-directional (from ﬁnance to growth) pos-
itive relationship for 10 developing countries. Using a modiﬁed OLS technique to estimate the cointegrating
relation, they demonstrate that there is no short-run causality between ﬁnancial deepening and output, while
there is a structural positive eﬀect in the long run. According to the demand-leading hypothesis, instead, the
increasing demand for ﬁnancial services that stems from a growing real sector induces the ﬁnancial sector
to expand. Based on this hypothesis, therefore, the lack of a developed ﬁnancial sector in less developed
countries is not a constraint to their economic growth, but merely a manifestation of the lack of demand for
ﬁnancial services by the real sector. Robinson (1979) initially supported this hypothesis, lately followed by
the works of Gurley and Shaw (1960), Goldsmith (1969) and Jung (1986). Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990)
develop a model where ﬁnancial intermediation promotes growth by increasing the returns to capital and, at
the same time, a more developed economy allows the ﬁnancial sector to oﬀer more costly ﬁnancial services.
Their model would thus suggest that the chicken-egg dilemma cannot be solved, as growth and ﬁnancial
structure are intrinsically linked and mutually reinforce each other. Goldsmith (1969) concludes that there
is no possibility of establishing with conﬁdence the direction of the causal mechanism.
Nevertheless, many macroeconometric techniques have been used to to disentangle the direction of causal-
ity. Calderòn and Liu (2003) apply the so-called Geweke decomposition test: they decompose the link between
ﬁnancial development and growth, considering the two possible causality directions (growth to ﬁnance and
ﬁnance to growth) and the instantaneous causality between the two. They ﬁnd that in 109 developing
and industrialized countries in the 1960-1994 period ﬁnancial development leads to economic growth, thus
supporting the supply-leading hypothesis. However, splitting the sample between developed and developing
countries, they also ﬁnd bi-directional causality, concluding that especially in developed economies real sector
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growth could signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the development of the ﬁnancial sector.
Patrick (1966) suggests that the direction of causality is indeed diﬀerent in developed and in developing
countries (stage-of-development hypothesis)2. During the initial stage of economic development, the ﬁnancial
sector would stimulate economic growth, mainly by favouring capital formation and higher savings (supply-
leading hypothesis). As economic development proceeds, however, the ﬁnancial sector would have to feed the
innovation of the real sector, through the development of new ﬁnancial services (demand-leading hypothesis).
In an attempt to verify this conjecture, Hassan et al. (2011) use a panel regression with cross-sectional
and time series-proxy measures, and ﬁnd a positive relationship between domestic credit development and
economic growth in low- and middle-income countries, and a negative one in high-income economies. This
stage-of-development hypothesis has also been corroborated by the empirical works of Demetriades and
Hussein (1996) and Shan et al. (2001) who, using time-series techniques, ﬁnd that the direction of causality
can run either way, according to the stage of development. This conclusion, however, has recently been
questioned by Rioja and Valev (2004) who examine a broad sample of 74 countries over the period 1960-1995
and uncover evidence that ﬁnancial development exerts a strong positive eﬀect on economic growth only once
it has reached a certain threshold; the eﬀect then fades away once economic development reaches very high
levels. Using GMM dynamic panel techniques, they ﬁnd that a 10% increase in ﬁnancial development would
lead to a 0.2 percent higher growth rate in high-income countries, without any statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect
in low-income ones.
Most of these empirical results appear sensitive to the sampling method (period, classiﬁcation of countries)
and to the econometric technique. Just to give examples of this sensitivity, using Granger causality tests,
Hassan et al. (2011) ﬁnd that, in the short run, there is a two-way causality between ﬁnance and growth in
all regions, except for the Sub-Saharan and East Asia & Paciﬁc regions, where causality runs from growth to
ﬁnance. Despite the fact that these two regions are the most underdeveloped in their sample (thus supporting
the idea of a non-linear relationship between economic growth and ﬁnancial development), the result contrasts
with the negative relationship found by De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) for Latin America (where instead
Hassan et al. ﬁnd a positive statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient).
The microeconomic approach
Macroeconometric studies encounter various problems including omitted variables, selection bias and multi-
collinearity. For instance, Driﬃll (2003) shows that the inclusion of relevant outliers and of regional dummies
(especially those for the Asian Tigers) makes the coeﬃcients on ﬁnancial development estimated by Levine
and Zervos (1998) almost insigniﬁcant. Due to such problems, more micro approaches have been developed
2This hypothesis was later supported by the empirical analysis of Jung (1986).
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looking for industry/ﬁrm level evidence of the direction of causality between ﬁnancial variables and growth.
One of the ﬁrst microeconometric approaches is the one used by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1995),
who estimate the proportion of ﬁrms' growth that could have been supported only by internal resources
and the portion that could be related to external ﬁnance, notably ﬁnancial markets. By using ﬁnancial
ﬁrm-level data for a sample of thirty countries from 1980 to 1991, they investigate how several measures of
stock market development (the ratio of market capitalization to GDP, the ratio of total value traded to GDP,
and the ratio of total value of shares traded to market capitalization) interact with ﬁrms' performance and
ﬁnancing decisions. Their ﬁndings support the ﬁnance-to-growth hypothesis, but they also underscore that
the development of the stock market initially beneﬁts only the largest ﬁrms.
The cornerstone of this micro-based empirical literature is probably the work of Rajan and Zingales (1998).
The authors stress that ﬁnancial development and growth could be driven by common omitted variables, such
as the propensity of households to save. To overcome this issue, they look at U.S. sector speciﬁc data: using
ﬁnancial statement data, they construct a proxy for each industry's need for external ﬁnance, deﬁned as the
diﬀerence between investments and cash ﬂow generated from operations. Under the assumption that capital
markets in the United States are relatively frictionless (i.e., U.S. listed ﬁrms' access to ﬁnancial markets is
not subject to frictions) they construct the technological demand for external ﬁnancing of each industrial
sector. Next, they use cross-country industry data (41 countries and 36 sectors) to test whether sectors that
rely more on external ﬁnance tend to grow faster, given the level of ﬁnancial development of the country. A
key assumption behind this estimation methodology is that technology (and, hence, the demand for funding)
could vary across industries but not across countries. By this procedure, they demonstrate that the causality
goes from ﬁnance to economic growth, as the ex-ante development of ﬁnancial markets facilitates the ex
post growth of sectors dependent on external ﬁnance. Based on the assumption that investments in new
establishments are more likely to be carried out by new ﬁrms (which depend more on external ﬁnance than
established ones), the authors show that ﬁnancial development has almost twice the eﬀect on the growth of
the number of establishments as it has on the growth of the average size of establishments. These results
carry through after controlling for country and industry ﬁxed eﬀects.
Guiso et al. (2005) use a similar approach to quantify the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development in the European
Union, obtaining supportive evidence for the ﬁnance-to-growth hypothesis. Using a panel of ﬁrm-level data
for companies in EU and transition countries for the period 1996-2001, they broaden the Rajan and Zingales'
approach using also ﬁrm-level data in order to check the robustness of the results. Although the magnitude
of the estimated eﬀect reﬂects diﬀerent country and sector speciﬁcities, they ﬁnd that ﬁnancial development
has a direct positive eﬀect on countries' and sectors' growth. The extension to ﬁrm-level data allows to
obtain additional insights into the structure of the link between ﬁnancial development and real variables.
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Their estimates highlight, for instance, that the growth of small enterprises is more sensitive to ﬁnancial
development than that of large ﬁrms. Finally, a similar approach is followed also by the work of de Serres
et al. (2006) in which the authors interact industry-speciﬁc measures of external ﬁnancial dependence with a
country-speciﬁc indicator of ﬁnancial development. Following Rajan and Zingales' approach, they ﬁnd that
more developed ﬁnancial systems increased ﬁrms' value-added growth and labour productivity growth in
OECD economies in the nineties.
A diﬀerent branch of microeconometric literature focuses on disentangling the ﬁnance-to-growth nexus
not by looking at ﬁrms' reliance on external funds, but on the ability of ﬁrms to better capture growth
opportunities thanks to the access to extra funding for investments. Put diﬀerently, this branch of literature
underlines that the ﬁnance-to-growth channel is based on faster capital reallocation to industries with good
growth opportunities. This is the case, for instance, of Fisman and Love (2004) who show that ﬁnancially
developed countries are characterized by faster value added growth in the sectors which grow faster in the
United States. This would imply that there is a natural reallocation of resources towards industries with
better global growth opportunities (as captured by the industry median of real sales growth between 1980 and
1990 in the United States). What emerges from this analysis, therefore, is that ﬁnancial development may
better align industry growth opportunities with actual growth. A further example of this branch of literature
is represented by the work of Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006) who show that ﬁnance increases the growth
of countries by reallocating capital more quickly to industries where investment opportunities arise. Using
industry-level data from 28 manufacturing industries in 67 countries in the 1980s, they show that industries
with better global investment opportunities grow faster in countries with greater ﬁnancial development. The
ﬁnancial markets of these countries are indeed able to attract and manage the capital necessary to satisfy
the high demand of the sectors that experience faster technical progress3.
A ﬁnal way of modelling the ﬁnance-growth link at the micro level is investigating how ﬁnancial devel-
opment impacts on ﬁrm entry and survival. Considering the ﬁrst aspect (ﬁrm entry), Berger, Hasan and
Klapper (2004) use a large data set which includes ﬁnancial data on over 3 million ﬁrms in 20 countries
located in Western and Eastern Europe, and ﬁnd a strong diﬀerential eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on entry
in external-ﬁnance-dependent sectors. Using private credit to GDP or stock market development as measures
of ﬁnancial development, their analysis suggests that entry is higher in more ﬁnancially intensive industries
(i.e. those that do more R&D) in countries that feature higher ﬁnancial development. These ﬁndings are also
supported by those of Beck et al. (2008) who, employing a cross-country cross-industry approach, show that
3Bekaert et al. (2007) seem to partially contradict the previous two papers. Using a diﬀerent measure of growth opportunities
(constructed by combining the country's pattern of industrial specialization with indicators of global industry growth opportu-
nities) and an industry-level dataset containing 50 countries, they show that ﬁnancial market openness (e.g., the liberalization
of equity markets) is a more important determinant of the ability to exploit growth opportunities than ﬁnancial development.
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ﬁnancial development exerts a disproportionately positive eﬀect on small ﬁrms. To reach this conclusion, the
authors ﬁrst construct an industry-level size variable that measures the industrial reliance on small ﬁrms;
next, they explore the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on entry rates.
Turning to ﬁrms' survival rate, a recent work of Aghion, Fally and Scarpetta (2007) use ﬁrm-level data
for 16 industrialized and emerging economies to analyze whether ﬁnancial development promotes post-entry
growth, even after controlling for the initial size at entry. Their results corroborate this hypothesis, especially
for those sectors with higher dependence on external ﬁnance and with lower average size at entry. Similarly,
using panel data on French manufacturing ﬁrms over the 1996 - 2004 period, Musso and Schiavo (2008) ﬁnd
that (i) an easier access to external funds lowers the probability that ﬁrms exit the market; (ii) access to
external ﬁnancial resources has a positive eﬀect on ﬁrms' survival rate; and (iii) ﬁnancial constraints are
related with productivity growth in the short run.
Instrumental variables for ﬁnancial development
A diﬀerent strand of literature has focused on identifying possible instrumental variables for ﬁnancial devel-
opment. Legal and accounting standards have been used to construct such instruments. The cornerstone of
this literature is represented by the work of La Porta et al. (1997), who examine legal rules covering protection
of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49
countries. Their analyses suggest that the legal and regulatory system play a critical role in inﬂuencing the
ability of the ﬁnancial system to provide high-quality ﬁnancial services. They classify countries according to
their legal origins, identifying four main legal systems: English, French, German, and Scandinavian. These
origins of the legal system are particularly relevant: they strongly inﬂuence the legal and regulatory envi-
ronment governing ﬁnancial sector transactions, therefore explaining cross-country diﬀerences in ﬁnancial
intermediary development.
Since legal origin is treated as an exogenous variable, it can be used as an instrumental variable in
ﬁnance-growth regressions. This is the approach followed by Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) who use
this instrumental variable to extract the exogenous component of ﬁnancial intermediary development. Their
ﬁndings show that, using legal origin dummy variables as instrumental variables, legal and regulatory changes
that strengthen creditor rights, contract enforcement, and accounting practices boost ﬁnancial intermediary
development with positive repercussions on economic growth.
Similarly, Levine (1999) examines the relationship between the legal system and banking development, and
demonstrates that using the legal environment to measure the exogenous component of banking development,
this indicator is robustly associated with per capita growth, physical capital accumulation, and productivity
growth. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) also investigate how diﬀerences in legal and ﬁnancial systems
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aﬀect ﬁrms' use of external ﬁnancing to fund growth. Using a sample of 30 developing and developed countries,
they show that the proportion of ﬁrms that grow at rates exceeding this predicted rate in each country is
associated with speciﬁc features of a country's legal and ﬁnancial systems. Their ﬁndings not only reveal that
well-developed legal systems result in better ﬁrms' growth performance, but also that ﬁnancial development
may indirectly increase dependence on external ﬁnancing by reducing ﬁrms' proﬁts.
3 Channels of interaction between ﬁnancial development and growth
Figure 4 summarizes the various theoretical arguments for why there could be a positive link between ﬁnancial
development and economic growth. The ﬁnancial system can promote growth by boosting the volume of
savings and investments or by improving the eﬃciency in the allocation of savings across investment plans.
The ﬁnancial sector can achieve such eﬀects by: i) reducing the costs of information; ii) improving the
management of risk; and iii) fostering innovation. This section provides a detailed review of both theoretical
and empirical ﬁndings, disentangling the key mechanisms through which ﬁnancial development can aﬀect
growth.
Figure 4: Financial development and its eﬀects on economic growth
Source: authors' elaboration
3.1 Investment volumes or allocative eﬃciency?
The ﬁnancial system can boost the volume of savings (that in a closed economy equal investments) or improve
the allocation of pooled savings across investment projects.
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Easing the pooling of savings
The ﬁnancial system pools together the savings generated in the household sector. In the banking sector,
this task is primarily performed by banks' local branches, that, being close to savers, are able to create stable
relationships with savers based on trust and on the repeated provision of ﬁnancial services. Figure 5 show
the number of commercial bank branches and automated teller machines (per 100,000 adults) in developed
and developing economies.
Figure 5: Commercial bank branches (per 100,000 adults) and Automated teller machines (ATMs) (per
100,000 adults)
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An increase in savings leads to output growth by allowing an increase in investment. To put in McKinnon's
words (1973): there is a widespread agreement that ﬂows of saving and investment should be voluntary and
signiﬁcantly decentralized in an open capital market in order to reach faster economic growth. This view
is also supported by Gurley and Shaw (1960), who demonstrate that the ﬁnancial sector promotes savings
and ﬁnally results into an increase in output growth. The process of transforming savings into investments
can involve several diﬃculties, such as transaction and information costs for pooling households' savings
(Levine,2005). If the ﬁnancial system helps mitigate these frictions, the pooling of resources becomes easier4.
A closer look at the overall eﬀect of ﬁnancial sector development on the volume of savings reveals an
ambiguous relationship. Hassan, Sanchez and Yu (2011) show empirically that a more developed domestic
ﬁnancial sector in developing countries may signiﬁcantly contribute to an increase in savings. However, using
a sample of OECD countries and developing economies in the 1970s and 1980s, Jappelli and Pagano (1994)
4Sirri and Tufano (1995) explain that without a pooling of wealth to fund enterprises, ﬁrm size would be constrained by the
wealth under the control of a single household.
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demonstrate that borrowing constraints can positively aﬀect savings. Their study, supported also by the
empirical ﬁndings of De Gregorio (1996), relies on the idea that in the absence of developed ﬁnancial markets
and institutions, while individuals are unable to borrow, they are induced to increase their precautionary
savings in order to face unexpected consumption needs in the future. Therefore, to the extent that ﬁnancial
development reduces borrowing constraints, saving ratios could be lowered5.
Easing the allocation of savings to productive investments
Besides aﬀecting the volume of savings, the ﬁnancial system eases the allocation of pooled savings to prof-
itable investment projects. Smith (1937) stresses that ﬁnancial arrangements lower transaction costs through
an eﬃcient management of resources, resulting in greater specialization and in faster technological improve-
ment. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) develop a model in which both economic development and ﬁnancial
development are endogenous. They argue that better ﬁnancial institutions lower the cost of transferring
savings to investment projects, increase yields, and speed up the growth process. Greenwood and Smith
(1997) examine the role of banks and stock markets and conclude that these help entrepreneurs identify
investment opportunities. Bencivenga, Smith and Starr (1996) show that, as the liquidity of ﬁnancial assets
increases in a country, resources are better allocated from an intertemporal point of view: the transformation
of short-term savings into long-term investments permits the ﬁnancing of projects with longer time cycles,
which are more likely to generate sustained growth. This view is shared by Levine (1991), who shows that
ﬁnancial development raises the ratio of savings devoted to long-run investments and reduces the likelihood
of premature liquidation of proﬁtable investment projects.
In Khan (2001), the reduction in the cost of ﬁnancial contracts implies a rise in the return on debt,
a decline in the spread between borrowing and lending rates, and ultimately a reduction in the premium
commanded by producers with access to investment loans. This virtuous cycle leads to an increase in the
eﬃciency of ﬁnancial intermediaries, raising the return on investments. A similar argument is put forward
by Trew (2008), who develops a growth model where the microeconomic frictions stem from the diﬃculty
of entrepreneurs to access credit. He demonstrates that, while the eﬃciency-growth link always exists, the
ﬁnancial depth-growth link may not. Matching growth rates with loan deposit spreads and with measures of
bank proﬁtability, he shows that the numerical implications of his model are broadly in line with data only
for the eﬃciency-growth channel.
5Nevertheless, both De Gregorio (1996) and Bencivenga and Smith (1993) stress that, in the presence of credit constraints,
agents will be unable to borrow in case of income drops. This will induce them to hold their savings in the form of highly liquid
and low productive assets, which, in turn, could have negative eﬀects on growth.
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Empirical ﬁndings
De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) ﬁnd empirically that the eﬃciency eﬀect is the main channel through which
ﬁnancial development promotes growth: according to their estimates, a 10% increase in credit speeds up
growth by 0.18% via eﬃciency gains and 0.07% via higher investment levels. This result is also consistent
with the empirical ﬁndings of King and Levine (1993). Their study estimates that if the ﬁnancial sector
expands by 10%, income increases more rapidly by 0.34 percentage points. Their analysis also concludes that
more than 70% of this eﬀect is attributable to higher eﬃciency induced by a more developed ﬁnancial sector.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) study a large sample of countries over the 1980s and observe that industrial
sectors that are relatively more in need of external ﬁnance develop disproportionately faster in countries
with more developed ﬁnancial markets. They argue that access to credit gives ﬁrms more opportunities to
search for proﬁtable investment projects. This result is consistent with an earlier study of Demirguc-Kunt
and Maksimovic (1995) who, using micro-data at the ﬁrm level, estimate that the growth rates of ﬁrms with
access to the credit market would not be sustained only by internal resources. Moreover, analyzing panel data
for 65 countries, 28 industries, and 33 years, Wurgler (2000) demonstrates that better ﬁnancial markets are
associated with a better allocation of capital: relative to countries with small ﬁnancial markets, ﬁnancially
developed countries boost investments in growing industries and cut them in declining ones. Therefore, the
key advantage of ﬁnancially developed countries is not the higher investment rate, but the better allocation
of resources to proﬁtable investment projects6. This point is reminiscent of Bagehot (1873) argument that
one of the reasons for England's good economic performance was an eﬃcient capital allocation.
3.2 Minimizing the cost of information
The ﬁnancial system can foster growth because it produces information on borrowers, helping overcome
information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers.
Ex-ante production of information
To explore this argument, Boyd and Smith (1992) develop a model of adverse selection in which veriﬁcation of
output is costly. They show that ﬁnancial intermediaries emerge because they have a comparative advantage
in information acquisition. By reducing credit rationing and interest rate diﬀerentials, ﬁnancial intermediaries
ultimately create the conditions for economic growth. This model captures the fact that there are relevant
costs for evaluating projects that could induce suboptimal levels of investment. For instance, it is usually
diﬃcult for households to collect information on investment opportunities, and the quality of the information
6Recently, increasing attention has also been devoted to the dynamic process through which credit is reallocated across ﬁrms
(see, e.g., Herrera, Kolar and Minetti (2011)).
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they obtain may not be good enough to ﬁnance projects. As a result, projects that are potentially highly
proﬁtable could be left idle.
The function of ﬁnancial intermediaries as information producers is also well described in Boyd, Prescott
and Smith (1988). Boyd et al. argue that asymmetric information in investment contracts results into an
adverse selection problem. In a situation in which information is poor, bad-type agents mimic good-type
ones, by promising to engage in projects of similar quality and proﬁtability. In this equilibrium, the number
of good projects ﬁnanced is lower than the optimum, and some bad-type projects are evaluated as good. The
authors show that an alternative solution is the formation of ﬁnancial intermediaries, that is, coalitions of
agents that evaluate projects and invest only in those estimated to be of high value7. Boyd et al. show that
if the coalition ends up funding some bad-type investments, because of lack of good-types projects, there will
be no waste of resources in their evaluation. Thus, the ex-ante information produced by the intermediary
coalition alleviates adverse selection problems.
Figure 6: Domestic credit provided by the banking sector (% of GDP)
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While Boyd et al. have in mind ﬁnancial intermediaries as banks that produce information and sell debt
contracts to ﬁrms, other authors show that the same reasoning could be applied to other types of ﬁnancial
intermediaries that sell the information they produce. In Bhattacharya and Pﬂeiderer (1985), the ﬁnancial
intermediary is run by a portfolio manager who has greater ability than savers to obtain and understand
signals about risky assets. The manager, however, does not invest on behalf of the saver, but his role is only
to transmit (by selling) the information to his principal. A more articulated version of the same idea is put
forward by Allen (1990), who characterizes the conditions under which information is merely sold to savers
7See also Araujo and Minetti (2007 and 2011) for models where ﬁnancial intermediaries help produce information.
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and the conditions under which the buyers of information act as intermediaries and resell information.
In Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) ﬁnancial intermediaries arise endogenously to facilitate trades. In-
termediaries increase the expected rate of return on investments through a research-type process during
which they produce information on the most proﬁtable uses of funds. As in Townsend (1978), the authors
assume that organizational structures are costly, thus the institutional setting of ﬁnancial intermediaries is
designed to minimize the costs of collecting and processing information. By allowing the migration of funds
to investments with high return, the development of the ﬁnancial infrastructure promotes economic growth8.
Ex-post production of information
The activities just described are linked to the role of ﬁnancial intermediaries as information producers at a
pre-contractual (ex-ante) stage. However, another crucial role of ﬁnancial intermediaries is the monitoring of
investment projects that they carry out at the post-contractual stage. In Diamond (1984), since monitoring is
costly, it is eﬃcient to delegate it to a specialized agent, namely a bank. According to the author, borrowers
have to be monitored so as to prevent moral hazard ex post. In fact, since lenders do not have suﬃcient
information on the output of investment projects, lending contracts cannot be contingent on output. However,
if a lender gathers information on production, the information asymmetry can be overcome. In a similar way,
Blackburn and Hung (1998) focus on moral hazard in lending contracts: ﬁrms have the incentive to claim
that their projects have failed in order to avoid repaying their loans to lenders. The authors show that a
solution to this problem is represented by incentive-compatible loan contracts, which are enforced through
a process of costly monitoring. However, as this process entails ﬁxed costs, the development of an advanced
ﬁnancial sector reduces the unit cost of the monitoring process, thus increasing the rate of growth of the
economy.
It thus emerges that ﬁnancial intermediaries have a critical role in producing ex-ante and ex-post infor-
mation. However, despite representing a (partial) solution to information asymmetry problems, this function
does not necessarily achieve the most eﬃcient outcome. In fact, there could be an ineﬃcient duplication of
information production costs if multiple agents end up producing the same information9. The most eﬃcient
solution would be that a small number of agents produce enough information and then sell it to uninformed
agents. Clearly, this solution can lead to a further problem of reliability of the information produced (who
monitors the monitor?). Hirshleifer (1971) stresses that it may be impossible for an information producer
8Similarly, Bencivenga and Smith (1993) develop a model in which all investment projects are ﬁnanced through credit and
examine the consequences of informational frictions on economic growth. Due to adverse selection in credit markets, in turn
resulting from the diﬃculty of distinguishing between high- and low-quality investments, lenders engage in credit rationing,
depressing growth.
9A mechanism through which ﬁnancial institutions such as banks can share information and avoid duplication of information
production are credit registers and bureaus (see, e.g., Doblas-Madrid and Minetti (2013), for empirical evidence).
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to credibly ensure that he has produced valuable information. Leland and Pyle (1977) show that ﬁnancial
intermediaries can overcome this reliability problem by investing their wealth in the assets about which they
produce information. The authors develop a model to analyse conﬂicts of interest between managers and
creditors, based on the assumption that entrepreneurs know the true characteristics and the performance of
the investment project for which they require ﬁnancing, while lenders do not have access to such information.
Due to this conﬂict, the cost of monitoring activities by creditors would be very high and the interest rate
applied on loans would be higher than the optimal. The authors show that ﬁnancial markets can overcome
this problem by inducing entrepreneurs of good quality to retain a large fraction of own capital in companies
to signal their quality (see also Campbell and Kracaw (1980) for a similar result).
Khan (2001) develops a dynamic general equilibrium model to study whether ﬁnancial development
reduces the costs of information asymmetries and thus results in higher economic growth. The starting
assumption is that it is costly for lenders to verify production and to discern risky projects. In this situation
ﬁnancial intermediaries arise that reduce the costly veriﬁcation of production when borrowers are unable to
repay loans. The ﬁnancial sector not only lets the most advanced producers beneﬁt from higher returns due
to lower information costs, but also it creates incentives for other producers to undertake the technological
changes needed to access investment loans, which in turn reduces ﬁnancing costs and promotes growth.
The importance of relationship lending
Relationship lending deserves special attention when investigating the role of ﬁnancial intermediaries as
information producers. A more developed ﬁnancial intermediary sector can to produce better information
through long and tight lending relationship. Boot (2000) stresses two core elements upon which relationship
lending is based: i) the engagement of lenders in multiple types of interactions with borrowers; and ii) the
repetition over time of such interactions, which reduces the cost of obtaining proprietary information on
borrowers.
Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) show that, through customer relations, banks are able to acquire private
information on ﬁrms to overcome situations of asymmetric distribution of information that prevents ﬁrms'
access to ﬁnancial markets. In addition, Boot and Thakor (2000) show that the establishment of these types
of relations involves lasting beneﬁts for businesses in terms of a greater amount of credit oﬀered and/or better
access to credit, as reﬂected in the interest rate charged and the guarantees required.
In this perspective, the key variable appears to be the length of credit relationships. Boot and Thakor
(1994), for instance, show that the possibility of carrying out repeated transactions is an eﬃcient method
to amortize the costs of screening activities. These gains, however, could potentially hide some negative
eﬀects, as demonstrated by Sharpe (1990). In fact, the previous models are based upon the exclusivity of
20
the bank-customer relationship: this exposes the debtor to the risk of being informationally captured by the
lender, which can exploit an informational monopoly power and impose higher interest rates ex post. This
detrimental eﬀect is also present in Boot and Thakor (2000) who illustrate how the lock-in eﬀect can distort
both banks' and ﬁrms' incentives, resulting in sub-optimal allocation of capital and/or worse growth decisions
of entrepreneurs.
Empirical studies conﬁrm the arguments of the models just discussed, although with some surprising
twists. Berlin and Mester (1999) use a data set of 600.000 small business loans over 12 years and do not
ﬁnd strong evidence in support of a particular role of relationship lending. Their ﬁnding contrasts, however,
with those of other empirical studies. Petersen and Rajan (1995) show that credit-constrained ﬁrms (in their
analysis, small enterprises) are more likely to be ﬁnanced when creditors can better internalize the beneﬁts of
assisting ﬁrms, i.e. when lending relationships are stable (thanks also to a more concentrated credit market).
Elsas and Krahnen (1998) show that relationship lenders are able to provide liquidity insurance to troubled
ﬁrms in situations of unexpected deterioration of borrower ratings. Moreover, D'Auria, Foglia and Reedtz
(1999) ﬁnd evidence of lower borrowing costs for Italian ﬁrms that have well established bank relationships.
Does relationship lending stimulate growth? Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) and Miarka (2000) analyze a
large sample of small and large Japanese enterprises in the periods 1977-1986 and 1985-1998 and ﬁnd that,
although close ties to a bank improve ﬁrms' access to capital, this relationship is not necessarily accompanied
by higher growth rates. Gambini and Zazzaro (2013) ﬁnd that that growth rate of Italian small enterprises
is negatively aﬀected by the maintenance of long-lasting ties with a bank, while the growth performance of
other ﬁrms increases with the length of the relationship.
3.4 Improving the management of risk
According to the literature, market-based ﬁnancial systems are especially good at ameliorating the manage-
ment of risk in ﬁnancial relations. Levine (2005) argues that, while bank-based systems can provide low-cost
services to deal with standard risk management, market-based systems can increase the ﬂexibility of these
services, oﬀering more products and tools for managing capital. This function is essential, as improvements
in the management of risk can positively aﬀect the rate of growth of the economy. Levine (2005) identiﬁes
three types of risk that could be better managed by a developed ﬁnancial sector: cross-sectional risk, liquidity
risk, and intertemporal risk.
Cross-sectional risk
A more developed ﬁnancial system is able to eﬃciently combine and manage both high- and low-risk projects.
This permits to achieve risk diversiﬁcation, which is crucial for channelling savings to investments with
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high return and high risk. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) develop a model in which minimum investment
requirements imply that agents cannot always insure themselves against the risk involved in investing in high-
return projects. They show that, by letting agents hold a diversiﬁed portfolio of investments, the ﬁnancial
sector is the only institution able to reallocate funds from agents who prefer safe returns (namely, current
account holders) to risky projects with high returns and high level of initial capital. Clearly, without such
a diversiﬁcation, high-return/high-risk projects would not be ﬁnanced, with a consequent negative eﬀect on
economic growth.
This ability of ﬁnancial institutions to induce a portfolio shift towards projects with higher expected
returns was also stressed by Gurley and Shaw (1955) who argued that the primary function of the ﬁnancial
sector in promoting growth is the transformation of funds from large groups of diﬀerent agents into diversiﬁed
debt for investors. Obstfeld (1994) develops an endogenous growth model in which greater diversiﬁcation
reduces savings if relative risk aversion exceeds one (with negative eﬀects on the level of investment), but this
eﬀect is outweighed by a portfolio shift towards risky assets, so that overall economic growth increases. A
counterargument, however, comes from Devereux and Smith (1994) who show that the welfare of a country
may be lower with a developed ﬁnancial system that allows risk sharing opportunities. The authors ﬁnd that
growth rates are lower in an equilibrium with full diversiﬁcation, as this reduces the equilibrium saving rate,
depressing growth. Therefore, the welfare gains from risk sharing have to be compared with the losses from
a reduced growth rate: the authors assess that, for reasonable parameter values, the losses can dominate and
welfare can be lower.
Liquidity risk
Turning to liquidity risk, a major contribution to the analysis is oﬀered by Levine and Zervos (1998). These
authors show that the initial level of stock market liquidity is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with
economic growth in a sample of 42 countries over the period 1976-1993. For instance, a one-standard-
deviation increase in the initial stock market liquidity is estimated to increase the per capita GDP growth by
0.8% per year and by 15 percentage points over the 18 years span. These empirical ﬁndings are consistent with
the predictions of the theoretical literature. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) show that, by mitigating liquidity
risk, the ﬁnancial sector can boost investments in high-returns and illiquid investments, thus accelerating
growth. Indeed, thanks to liquid capital markets, savers can ﬁnance projects with high productivity and at
the same time they can hold liquid assets (equity, bonds, etc.) that can be quickly and easily sold if they
need access to their savings. In this framework, banks face a predictable demand for liquidity resulting from
the law of large numbers and can, therefore, allocate funds more eﬃciently than single individuals.
Building on Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Levine (1991) constructs an endogenous growth model in which
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a stock market emerges that allocates risk in the economy (Figure 7 shows the stock market capitalization
in diﬀerent regions of the world; Figure 8 shows the value of stocks traded in the same areas). Levine shows
that the stock market alters the steady state growth rate by allowing agents to diversify their portfolios
in case of liquidity shocks. A more developed ﬁnancial system, in fact, mitigates liquidity risk by letting
entrepreneurs hit by liquidity shocks sell their shares to other investors. This way, capital is not prematurely
liquidated to satisfy short-run liquidity needs and the accumulation of capital in the economy speeds up,
resulting in greater economic growth. This function, however, is not exclusive of stock markets: Diamond
(1991) shows that when there are large barriers to the development of a system of equity trading, the banking
sector naturally takes a liquidity-enhancing role in the economy, replicating the same equilibrium allocation
of capital that arises with liquid equity markets.
Figure 7: Market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP)
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To be clear, not all studies agree that liquid stock markets positively aﬀect the rate of growth of the
economy, and this could support the development of a bank-based ﬁnancial system. For instance, Bhide
(1993) shows that highly liquid stock markets can let investors diversify cheaply, but at the same time can
weaken the internal monitoring system of ﬁnancial intermediaries, by reducing the costs of exit of unhappy
stockholders. This can end up in a worse allocation of resources compared to a bank-based system where
breaking credit relationships entails high costs and hence monitoring incentives are stronger. On top of these
problems, an excessive increase in the liquidity of ﬁnancial markets can also expose the economy to problems
of instability when the economy is hit by aggregate shocks. This point has been already discussed in Section
1, with particular reference to the recent analysis of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).
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Figure 8: Stocks traded, total value (% of GDP)
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Intertemporal risk
The last type of risk to be considered is intertemporal risk. Greenwood and Smith (1997) underline that
the provision of liquidity by ﬁnancial markets limits the exposure of savers to idiosyncratic risk and prevents
the costly premature liquidation of long-term investments. Allen and Gale (1997) develop an overlapping
generations model in which more developed ﬁnancial intermediaries allow to channel a higher fraction of
savings to long-run investment projects. These oﬀer returns that are relatively low in booms and relatively
high in recessions and thus favour diversiﬁcation of risk across generations, eliminating the ineﬃciencies due
to lack of inter-temporal smoothing. This result also suggests that the ﬁnancial sector can have a remarkable
eﬀect on the development of innovative activities that have high growth potential in the long run. We address
this point in the next section.
3.4 Easing innovation processes
Schumpeter (1961) showed that ﬁnancial institutions are important for economic activity because they evalu-
ate and ﬁnance entrepreneurs engaging in research and development (R&D). The role of ﬁnancial institutions
in solving information problems and managing risk have been discussed above. What we have not yet exam-
ined, however, is how these functions could promote innovation.
24
A complex theoretical relationship
Innovation is a trial-and-error process, in which it may be initially necessary to ﬁnance numerous unexpected
opportunities, about which little is known ex ante, but that could have high future returns (Dosi, 1990).
Therefore, due to the uncertainty associated with R&D activities, a more developed ﬁnancial system can
be essential to ensure the necessary screening mechanism, thus promoting innovation and growth. Xu and
Huang (1999) argue that, since the uncertainty associated with R&D projects can only be solved when a
project is carried out, ex-post selection is more eﬀective than ex-ante selection. The authors show that,
when ﬁnancial institutions are suﬃciently developed and multi-banking ﬁnancing arrangements are set up
(in which projects are co-ﬁnanced by diﬀerent actors), it is possible to develop a screening mechanism that
discards bad projects, even in cases in which the reﬁnancing of such projects could be proﬁtable ex post.
This prediction is consistent with the cited works of Rajan and Zingales (1998), as the industries that require
most external ﬁnancing are primarily those more innovative, and of Wurgler (2000), as the most innovative
industries are also those likely to grow faster.
However, the improvement in the information about R&D projects is just one perspective of the analysis.
Examining the role of risk, Petersen and Rajan (1995) reach opposite conclusions. Building a model in
which concentrated banking sectors allow for intertemporal risk sharing, they show that only a concentrated
banking sector (i.e., one in which entrepreneurial projects are ﬁnanced by only one bank) is able to guarantee
low cost of funding in the early stages of ﬁrm development. Moreover, Carpenter, Lazonick and O'Sullivan
(2003) ﬁnd that investments are rarely ﬁnanced externally in innovative sectors such as the optical network
industry.
King and Levine (1993) stress the role of ﬁnancial intermediaries both as evaluators of potential inno-
vators and providers of insurance for innovators. Thanks to the cross-sectional diversiﬁcation obtained by
intermediaries, the economy is able to promote investments in growth-enhancing innovative activities that
feature high level of risk and thus are not naturally ﬁnanced by risk-averse agents. Morales (2003), instead,
applies a diﬀerent approach based on the growth model of Aghion and Howitt (1998), and considers capital
accumulation and R&D activities as complementary sources of growth. He builds a model in which the
ﬁnancial sector aﬀects the ﬁnancing of R&D activities. He demonstrates that ﬁnancial activity does have
an important role in reducing the incidence of moral hazard in research, increasing the level of monitoring
and the probability of success of research projects. However, this impact of the ﬁnancial sector on research
productivity causes two opposite eﬀects on growth. On the one hand, ﬁnancial development fosters research
projects with positive spillovers on other sectors of the economy, resulting in higher productivity in the whole
economy. On the other hand, the increased R&D productivity raises the probability that an incumbent
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producer is replaced by an innovator, thus reducing the incentives to accumulate capital.
Block (2002) takes a critical approach towards all the above views. He stresses that often ﬁrms do not
raise funds to allocate them to speciﬁc innovative projects, but the majority of funds are given to companies
that only subsequently allocate the resources to particular innovative investments. For this reason, one
cannot neglect that a key role in the link between ﬁnancial development and innovation is played by the
organizational and decisions processes within ﬁrms. Mayer (1996) develops a model of ownership structure in
which economies with more concentrated stakeholders encourage long-term commitment and this allows to
allocate internal resources towards R&D projects. Considering a sample of 14 OECD countries, Carlin and
Mayer (2003) show that there is no relation between concentration of ownership and R&D, which suggests
that ownership concentration provides the commitment needed to encourage basic investment but not more
advanced training of skills. Using microeconomic data on a large sample of Italian manufacturers, Minetti,
Murro and Paiella (2011) ﬁnd instead that an increase in ownership concentration tends to reduce ﬁrms'
innovation eﬀorts, especially at the R&D stage.
Assessing the pros and cons of market-based and bank-based ﬁnancial systems in promoting innovation,
Stiglitz (1985) underscores that a very liquid market-based system could lead to an equilibrium in which
investors have no incentive to undertake pioneering projects, as the information about innovations could
quickly spread to competitors. By contrast, bank-based systems could create more stable relationships and
convince entrepreneurs to invest in innovation. Boot, Greenbaum and Thakor (1993) show that the reputation
in securing the information provided by innovators could be higher in the case of a bank-based system, thus
increasing the resources devoted to R&D projects. However, Carlin and Mayer (2003) contend that, being
characterized by more dispersed ownership, market-based systems can be associated with R&D projects of
higher risk, while bank-based systems, where ownership is more concentrated, are oriented towards longer-
term investments with a more imitative nature.
Empirical ﬁndings
The literature that tests the role of ﬁnancial markets in the innovation process is recent, but already rich. A
ﬁrst concern in deﬁning a successful empirical strategy is to rule out the possibility that the causality goes
from innovation to ﬁnancial development. In fact, a possible explanation of the existence of a relationship
between these two variables is that only those economies with good innovation prospects develop ﬁnancial
markets that are able to provide the funds necessary to support innovation.
The second concern is linked to the fact that it is not necessarily demonstrated that ﬁnancing constraints
should matter for R&D activity. As argued by Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), R&D investment seems
to be often ﬁnanced by internally generated cash ﬂow in advanced economies. The standard approach for
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testing this prediction is examining the cash ﬂow sensitivity of investment: despite its large application in
many studies, this approach has not delivered a deﬁnitive answer. Providing a comprehensive summary
of the literature on this issue, Hall and Lerner (2009) conclude that this still remains an open question.
However, analysing a large sample of European ﬁrms, Brown, Fazzari and Petersen (2009) show that ﬁnancing
constraints aﬀect the R&D activity of ﬁrms.
A third issue is whether the evidence suggests that market-based ﬁnancial systems are preferable or not
to bank-based systems for promoting innovation. Some empirical evidence that R&D-intensive ﬁrms make
relatively little use of debt ﬁnance is provided by Aghion et al. (2005) who, using data on publicly traded U.K.
ﬁrms, ﬁnd that businesses with positive but low R&D use more debt ﬁnance than businesses that report no
R&D, but the use of debt ﬁnance falls with R&D intensity among ﬁrms that report R&D. Yet, other studies
show that bank-based ﬁnancial systems can have a key role in supporting innovation. As demonstrated by
Benfratello, Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (2008) in the analysis of over 6,000 Italian enterprises during the
1990s, a higher capillarity of the banking sector (measured as the density of the network of bank branches in
Italian provinces) is capable of generating signiﬁcant eﬀects on the innovative processes of ﬁrms, increasing
the likelihood of introducing a process (product) innovation by about 6% (4.5%) in case the density goes from
30 to 50 branches per 100 inhabitants. This positive eﬀect of banking development is also reﬂected in the
amount of resources that companies devote to R&D. Studying more than 4,000 Italian businesses in the early
2000s, Herrera and Minetti (2007) show that the length of the credit relationships between banks and ﬁrms
also increases the probability of innovation. The authors point out that this eﬀect is particularly signiﬁcant in
the decision of a company to introduce product innovations (rather than process ones). A subsequent analysis
of Minetti (2011) demonstrates that banks are particularly eﬀective at fostering incremental innovations, i.e.
innovations that do not drastically change the production processes of ﬁrms. He argues that this result is
perhaps linked to banks' limited knowledge of radically new technologies.
Finally, two recent empirical studies conﬁrm the innovation-ﬁnancial development nexus. Using a large
data set including 34 developed and emerging countries and using the patenting rate as a proxy of the
innovation activity of a country, Hsu et al. (2011) show that, while the development of equity markets
encourages innovation, credit market development impedes innovation. This is particularly true in emerging
countries, and in countries with low quality of the legal system and with weak creditor protection. In the
same vein, Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2012) analyze over 19,000 ﬁrms across 47 developing
economies and ﬁnd that a ﬁrm's access to ﬁnance is an important determinant of the extent of innovation it
undertakes. Moreover, ﬁnancing from foreign banks appears to be associated with higher levels of innovation
compared to ﬁnancing from domestic banks.
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4 Conclusions
This paper has reviewed the link between the development of the ﬁnancial structure and economic growth.
For reasons of space we have not touched on some important areas of research. One such area is the role played
by inequality in the relationship between ﬁnance and growth. Diﬃculties in accessing ﬁnancial markets can
not only have adverse consequences on average income levels but also increase income, wealth, and human
capital inequality. In a pioneering work, Benabou (1966) posed the question of why two countries that start
from a similar macroeconomic situation, such as Philippines and South Korea in the post-war period, have
divergent development trajectories. He conjectured that the Philippines were penalized by a more unequal
distribution of wealth and an underdeveloped ﬁnancial system. The idea is that when ﬁnancial markets are
ineﬃcient, the returns across investment projects are not equalized. The greater the level of inequality, the
larger the return diﬀerentials, and the bigger the loss in potential aggregate output. In addition, because
in developing countries there is a good degree of learning-by-doing in production, and because production
stimulates the assimilation of foreign technologies, the static loss of GDP translates into slower long-run
growth.
Financial constraints can also have detrimental eﬀects on investments in education. Households with
limited access to ﬁnance invest relatively less in human capital than they would do in a world with educational
credit. This mechanism was ﬁrst examined by Galor and Zeira (1993) where education is an indivisible
investment, but generates greater private and social returns than physical capital (which, however, can be
increased by small amounts). Lack of credit would induce low-income households to overinvest in physical
capital. As a result income inequality increases from one generation to the next, and the economy's growth
rate, which depends on the rate of accumulation of human capital, is smaller than it would be in a world with
perfect credit markets. It is a fact, however, that the government takes an active role in ﬁnancing education
directly and indirectly. Arguably, this is the reason the Gini coeﬃcients for education are lower than those
for income and wealth (Thomas et al., 2001). Several advanced economies have witnessed an increase in
income and wealth inequality in the last two decades or so. In addition, some of these economies have also
experienced growth rates lower than their historical trend. The current debate on the reforms of the ﬁnancial
sector following the Great Recession will necessarily have to take into account the complex linkages among
ﬁnance, growth and inequality.
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